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niversity with a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering. He has served in a number of assignments in the Air Force’s and Department of Defense’s space acquisition sectors, including the Space and Missile System Systems Center, National Reconnaissance Office, and Secretary of the Air Force staff, Is Cyber Deterrence Possible? Air Force Research Institute Perspectives on Cyber Power, 2017 https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/20/2001846608/-1/-1/0/CPP_0004_MCKENZIE_CYBER_DETERRENCE.PDF, /Kent Denver-MB, CE, DP-L While offensive capabilities comprise an effective military strategy, they are not likely to act as a strong deterrence against cyber attacks. Here’s why. To serve as an effective deterrent, the use of offensive cyber tactics as a potential penalty measure in response to a cyber attack must be credible. The United States will likely be judicious in its use of offensive cyber weapons, defined as “digital objects that can be used to achieve military objectives by disabling key functions of computer systems and networks.”16 When employed, these weapons will identify which vulnerabilities are being exploited in adversary networks and thus expose US capabilities. As a result, the adversary can then patch those vulnerabilities; the offensive weapon then becomes useless against that particular adversary and potentially others. Offensive cyber weapons have a limited shelf life and may take years to develop. The United States would be wise to explore other instruments of national power before it exposes a fragile offensive cyber weapon. Challenges for Cyber Deterrence Attribution Now that we have a basic definition of deterrence and the attributes necessary for success, the next step is to look at the challenges associated with applying those principles to cyberspace. [in addition] One of the biggest barriers to effective cyber deterrence is the concept of attribution. Intelligence expert Bob Gourley maintains that “you cannot deter unless you can punish and you cannot effectively punish unless you have attribution.”17 Attribution in the cyber domain is possible, but in some circumstances it can be difficult and time-consuming. The complex structure of the Internet, immature political and legal policies, and global nature of the cyber domain make operating anonymously possible. Adversaries can exploit any number of system or protocol vulnerabilities to hide or spoof their

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電気工学の理学士号を取得しています。彼は、宇宙およびミサイルシステムシステムセンター、国立偵察局、空軍スタッフの秘書を含む、空軍および国防総省の宇宙取得部門で多くの任務に従事しました。サイバー抑止は可能ですか？エアF

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He holds a BS in Electrical Engineering. He has worked on many missions in the Air Force and Pentagon space acquisition divisions, including the Space and Missile Systems Center, the National Reconnaissance Service, and the secretary of the Air Force staff. Is cyber deterrence possible? Air F

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彼は電気工学の理学士号を取得しています。彼は、スペースアンドミサイルシステムセンター、国立偵察局、空軍スタッフの秘書など、空軍とペンタゴンの宇宙取得部門で多くの任務に携わってきました。サイバー抑止は可能ですか？エアF

BACK INTO ENGLISH

He holds a BS in Electrical Engineering. He has been involved in many roles in the Air Force and Pentagon space acquisition divisions, including the Space and Missile System Center, the National Reconnaissance Service, and the secretary of the Air Force staff. Is cyber deterrence possible? Air F

INTO JAPANESE

彼は電気工学の理学士号を取得しています。彼は、空軍およびミサイルシステムセンター、国家偵察局、空軍スタッフの秘書など、空軍およびペンタゴンの宇宙取得部門で多くの役割に携わってきました。サイバー抑止は可能ですか？エアF

BACK INTO ENGLISH

He holds a BS in Electrical Engineering. He has been involved in many roles in the Air Force and Pentagon space acquisition departments, including the Air Force and Missile Systems Center, the National Reconnaissance Bureau, and the secretary of the Air Force staff. Is cyber deterrence possible? Air F

INTO JAPANESE

彼は電気工学の理学士号を取得しています。彼は、空軍およびミサイルシステムセンター、国家偵察局、空軍スタッフの秘書など、空軍およびペンタゴンの宇宙取得部門で多くの役割に携わってきました。サイバー抑止は可能ですか？エアF

BACK INTO ENGLISH

He holds a BS in Electrical Engineering. He has been involved in many roles in the Air Force and Pentagon space acquisition departments, including the Air Force and Missile Systems Center, the National Reconnaissance Bureau, and the secretary of the Air Force staff. Is cyber deterrence possible? Air F